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Abstract
Stemming from our previous work on BACI, a boxed ambient calculus with communication in-
terfaces, we deﬁne a new calculus that further enhances communication mechanisms and mobility
control by introducing multiple communication ports, access control lists, and port hiding.
The development of the calculus is mainly focused on three objectives: separation of concerns
between mobility and communication, ﬁne-grained controls, and locality. Communication primi-
tives use ports to establish communication channels between ambients, while ambient names are
only used for mobility. In order to achieve a better control over mobility, the calculus includes
co-capabilities a` la Safe Ambients, but with the addition of access control lists. These lists contain
the names of the ambients that are allowed to enter or exit the ambient with that co-capability.
The resulting calculus not only provides more ﬂexibility and expressiveness than Boxed Ambients,
but also enables simpler implementations using more powerful constructs for communication and
mobility. We establish the basic meta-theory of the calculus by providing rules for type safety and
showing that typing is preserved during execution.
Keywords: ambients, mobility, computing models
1 Introduction
In Cardelli and Gordon’s Mobile Ambients (MA)[6], ambients represent nested
computational environments containing data and live computation. Ambients
1 This research was supported in part by the National Science Foundation project No. CCR-
0220286 ITR: Secure Electronic Transactions. The funding bodies are not responsible for
any use that might be made of the results presented here.
2 Email: pablo@cs.stevens.edu
3 Email: abc@cs.stevens.edu
Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 135 (2006) 61–71
1571-0661  ©  2 006  Else vier B.V. 
www.elsevier.com/locate/entcs
doi:10.1016/j.entcs.2005.09.021
Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.
are capable of moving under the inﬂuence of the process they enclose and can
dissolve their perimeter with an open operation. Mobile Ambients provide a
direct characterization of computational processes as well as computational
devices.
Boxed Ambients (BA) [3] evolved from MA, by removing the ability of an
ambient to dissolve its boundary. In BA, an ambient is a “box” that cannot be
opened. This notion of closed ambient provides complete encapsulation of the
agents an ambient contains. To enable the communication lost by disabling
the open operation, ambients are equipped with communication channels to
exchange information with adjacent ambients (parent and children ambients).
Both in MA and BA, ambient mobility is commanded by processes inside
the ambient. The commands for mobility are called capabilities. The capa-
bilities tell an ambient to open or move inside or outside another ambient.
Unrestricted mobility, however, can lead to undesired interferences between
two concurrent processes. Addressing this concern, control over capabilities
was ﬁrst introduced in Safe Ambients [10] and later used in New Boxed Am-
bients (NBA) [4] in the form of co-capabilities. A capability can be exercised
only in the presence of a matching co-capability. Hence, in order to enter
an ambient using the in capability, that ambient must contain a matching
in co-capability authorizing that access; similarly for exiting using the out
capability.
Bonelli et al.[1] introduced the notion of local views in the calculus of
Boxed Ambients with Communication Interfaces (BACI). In this calculus,
each ambient has an associated communication port and a local view. The
communication port is used for sending and receiving messages to and from
other ambients, and the local view represents the communication types that
are used by the processes enclosed inside the ambient. BACI is ﬂexible enough
to allow an ambient to communicate with diﬀerent parents using diﬀerent
types. However, this ﬂexibility comes with the price of a rather complex
syntax and some run-time type checking required to guarantee type safety.
In this paper, we present an enhanced and simpliﬁed version of BACI
called BACIv2. In this version, we share the same goals present in the original
version: to stress the separation between communication and mobility and to
reduce the amount of global information in the calculus. However, this time,
we achieve a better trade-oﬀ between locality, expressiveness and the calculus
complexity.
In BACIv2, processes inside an ambient can use multiple ports –each one
with its own communication type– to communicate with other neighboring
processes within or outside the ambient. The usage of multiple ports allows, for
instance, the straightforward speciﬁcation of a host exposing several services
P. Garralda, A. Compagnoni / Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 135 (2006) 61–7162
like ssh or ftp, using a diﬀerent port for each service.
In the case where multiple ports are not available, as in BA [3], we may
use additional ambients to simulate additional communication channels. How-
ever, having multiple ports as primitives has the advantage of not requiring
additional co-capabilities necessary for the mobility of such auxiliary ambients.
A sample usage of multiple ports could be the implementation of data
structures such as a stack. Using ports, we can encapsulate the implementa-
tion of the stack within a single ambient, using diﬀerent ports for each of the
stack operations as depicted in Figure 1(a).
user ambient
stack
isEmptypop
push
(a) Stack ambient using multiple ports
auth perimeter
network
access granted
AUTH
pwd
system
agent
(b) Dynamic ambient access control
Fig. 1. Some examples in BACIv2.
BACIv2 also enhances mobility controls by using ﬁne-grained co-capabilities.
Each co-capability has an access control list to restrict access to only those
ambients in the list.
Access control lists are ﬂexible enough to be used to implement access
control using passwords similar to the mechanisms found in NBA [5]. Figure
1(b) depicts an ambient that, in order to enter a restricted ambient, needs to
authenticate itself by sending the password to an authenticator process located
outside the restricted ambient. Next, the authenticator process validates the
password and instructs the restricted ambient to grant access to the validated
ambient. Finally, the restricted ambient allows the access of the incoming
ambient, and the operation is completed.
BACIv2 also introduces port name restriction. This restriction is used to
create truly private communication channels, preventing undesired communi-
cation interferences. Moreover, new ports can be created dynamically using
a special primitive called connect. The connect primitive binds two diﬀerent
ports: one from the parent ambient and one from a child ambient, using a
new (private) port name. This construct creates new communication chan-
nels without requiring any previous knowledge of the parent or child ambient
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Messages:
M,N ::= α name
| C capability
Capabilities:
C,D ::= in α enter
| outTo α exit
| C.D path
| x variable
Preﬁxes:
π ::= C capabilities
| (x˜ : ϕ˜)η receive
| 〈M˜〉η send
| in{χ} co-enter
| outTo{χ} co-exit
| connect↓(c : ϕ˜) connect down
| connect↑(c : ϕ˜) connect up
Access control list:
χ ::= any unrestricted
| α˜ list of names
Ports:
c, u, v constant
Basic types
ϕ ::= amb ambient
| cap capability
Processes:
P,Q ::= 0 nil process
| P | Q composition
| !π.P replication
| (ν n : amb)P restriction
| (νp c : ϕ˜)P port restr.
| π.P preﬁxing
| α[ P ] ambient
| [α = β]{P}{Q} equality
Names:
α, β ::= n constant
| x variable
Locations:
η ::= ↑c upward
| ↓c downward
| c local
Typing environments
Σ ::= ∅ empty
| Σ, x : ϕ variable
Process interface type
Γ ::= ∅ empty
| Γ, τ interface
Communication types
τ ::= c : ϕ˜ typed port
Table 1
Syntax of BACIv2
names or the ports they use.
2 BACIv2
2.1 Syntax and Semantics
The complete syntax of the calculus is summarized in Table 1. It includes two
main syntactic categories: processes and messages. Messages, ranged over by
M and N , include ambient names and capabilities. Ambient names, ranged
over by α and β, can be either constant ambient names or name variables.
Capabilities, ranged over by C and D, can be either the capabilities for en-
tering and exiting an ambient, variables, or a “path” which is a sequence of
capabilities describing a mobility path. In addition to the sets of variables and
ambient names, we also have the set of ports used for communication. The
set of variables represents the variables that are bound by the receive action
and may appear as a capability, an ambient name or a message. The ambient
names are a set of constants. The set of ports is the set of names used to
address communication.
Processes, ranged over by P , Q, R, and S, are built from the constructors of
inactivity, showing the end of a process; parallel composition of two processes;
replication, used for recursion; ambient and port name restriction; preﬁxing,
where π is an operation that is followed by a continuation process P ; a named
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ambient encapsulating a process; and, ﬁnally, equality testing for branching to
either P or Q depending on whether α is equal to β.
Process preﬁxes can be divided into four diﬀerent groups: capabilities,
message send and receive, restricted co-capabilities and connects. Capabilities
command an ambient to move inside or outside another ambient. Send and
receive exchange messages between processes at diﬀerent locations. We use
the term location to denote a port located either in the parent, in a child
ambient or locally in the same ambient. Co-capabilities control the entrance
or exit to an ambient allowing the entrance only to those ambients included
in its access control list. Finally, connect can be used to dynamically create a
new port (of type ϕ˜) between proceses in the child and parent ambients.
Capabilities in BACIv2 are slightly diﬀerent from the ones that can be
found in other ambient calculi [6,3,10,5]. The out(To) capability refers to the
target ambient instead of referring to the ambient that is being exited. This
implies that the moving ambient must know its destination. However, after
executing outTo, a process can be certain of its current location. This is more
diﬃcult to assert with the standard out capability found in other ambient
calculi.
Send and receive use locations to address a particular port in a parent or
a child. In order to establish a communication, both send and receive must
have matching port names.
This can be seen in the input reduction rule:
(input ↓ -↑)
(x˜ : ϕ˜)↓c.P
∣
∣ n[ 〈M˜〉↑c.Q | R ] −→ P{x˜ := M˜}
∣
∣ n[ Q | R ]
where ↓c matches ↑c.
Only capabilities and ambient names can be sent as messages. However,
the syntax can be easily extended to allow other kinds of messages, such as
integers or booleans.
Co-capabilities in{} and outTo{} have a list of ambients that are allowed
to enter (or exit) using that co-capability. Additionally, the label any can be
used to denote unrestricted access. Here is the reduction rule for exit:
(exit)
k[ m[ n[ outTo k.P1 | P2 ]
∣
∣ Q1 ] outTo{χ}.Q2 | Q3 ] −→
k[ m[ Q1 ]
∣
∣n[ P1 | P2 ]
∣
∣ Q2 | Q3 ]
where χ is {n˜1, n, n˜2} or any
Notice that the outTo refers to the grand-parent ambient instead of the
parent ambient. In this way, the moving ambient can specify the target am-
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bient.
Finally, the connect preﬁx allows a process to create a new private channel
shared with another process located in the parent or a child ambient.
(connect)
connect↓(u : ϕ˜).P
∣
∣ n[ connect↑(v : ϕ˜).Q | R ] −→
(ν p c : ϕ˜)(P{u := c}
∣
∣ n[ Q{v := c} | R ])
where c is a fresh port name.
The complete set of reduction rules include standard structural rules as
well as rules for (output) and (enter) which are analogous to the ones
presented above. The rules are omitted here for lack of space.
3 Typing Judgments
There exist two diﬀerent typing judgments, one for messages and one for
processes:
• Σ  M : ϕ, read “M is a well-formed message of type ϕ in Σ”, and
• Σ P : Γ, read “P is a well-formed process of type is Γ in Σ”.
Both judgments assume a set to type assignments Σ for free variables.
The ﬁrst judgment checks that a message is built correctly with respect
to a message type. The judgment Σ P : Γ checks that a process P is built
correctly and also that each port in P is used the type associated with it on the
interface Γ. The process interface exhibits the communication types used by P
and can be seen as a partial function from port names to their communication
types. In contrast to other systems, there is no communication type associated
with an ambient name: instead, an ambient name has the constant type amb.
Γ assigns communication types to each free port c used in P . Ports hidden
using port restriction (νp c : ϕ˜) do not appear in Γ, since their type is declared
in the restriction operation. This fact is reﬂected in the corresponding typing
rule:
(proc-p-res)
Σ P : Γ, c : ϕ˜
Σ (ν p c : ϕ˜)P : Γ
Similarly, the connect operation also abstracts port names, hiding them
from the resulting Γ. The complete set of typing rules is omitted for lack of
space.
The type system guarantees that communication inside ambients and across
ambient boundaries never leads to type mismatches. Additionally, we show
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that a typing for a process is preserved after reduction.
Theorem 3.1 (Subject Reduction)
If Σ P : Γ and P −→ Q then ΣQ : Γ.
4 Examples
4.1 Stack
In this example, we model a stack for storing names using multiple ports.
We consider three primitive operations applied to stacks: push, pop, isEmpty.
Push takes an element and inserts it on the top of the stack; pop removes the
element on top and returns it as a result of the operation; and isEmpty is used
to query whether the stack is empty.
For the implementation of these operations we use diﬀerent ports. In fact,
we use two ports per operation: one for receiving the request and the other to
deliver the response (possibly with the exception of the push operation that
may not require a response). In general, we name each port using the name
of the operation along with a subindex indicating whether it is receiving a
request (req) or submitting a response (res).
The stack is represented by the following ambient.
STACK = stack[ INTERNALS | !PUSH | !POP | !ISEMPTY ]
The processes inside the stack can be divided into four parts: one which
keeps the internal state and manages some internal operations, and the pro-
cesses that manage each operation.
The implementation uses a linked list of nodes. Each node is an ambient
containing a “stacked” value. A local port called top is used as a variable to
store the name of the node that holds the top value of the stack.
The INTERNALS part holds the current state of the stack. Initially, the
stack is empty, so INTERNALS only contains the initial state: INITSTATE .
INITSTATE 4 = 〈empty〉top
We use the name empty to denote that the stack is empty; therefore, empty
is “stored” as the top.
In order to manipulate this internal state, we introduce two syntactic def-
initions: gettop and settop.
gettop(x).P = (x)top.(P | 〈x〉top)
settop(n).P = P | (x)top.〈n〉top
4 In general, we omit the nil process at the end of a process expression for sake of readability.
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gettop retrieves the name of the node ambient that holds the top value
of the stack and binds it to a variable. settop takes an ambient name (i.e.
a node name) as an argument and sets that name to be the top of the stack.
Using these macros, we can deﬁne the ISEMPTY operation:
ISEMPTY 5 =
( )↑isEmptyreq .gettop(t).[t = empty]{〈true〉↑isEmptyres}{〈false〉↑isEmptyres}
First, a request is received on the port isEmptyreq. Then, after retrieving
the top name, the process checks if it is equal to empty or not, returning the
names true or false on the port isEmptyres.
The PUSH operation receives a value v over the port pushreq and creates
a new node with that value.
PUSH = (v)↑pushreq .NEWNODE (v)
The newly created node stores the value at the top of the stack and records
the name of the old top of the stack as the next node in the linked list.
NEWNODE (x) =
(ν node : amb)gettop(t).(node[ NODE INT (x, t) ] | settop(node))
Internally, each node has a process that is ready to release the stored value
after it is triggered by the entrance of a special messenger ambient called
popper. As its name suggests, the sole purpose of the popper ambient is as a
signal to the node that is being popped from the stack.
NODE INT (v, t) = in{popper}.〈(v, t)〉↑release
After this signal, the node retrieves the stored value and also the name of the
following node in the stack. This feature of the nodes is used by the POP
operation. After receiving a request via the popreq port, the POP operation
sends a messenger ambient to the top node to start the removing process.
POP = ( )↑popreq .gettop(t).(popper[ in t ] | (v, t′)↓release.settop(t′).〈v〉↑popres)
Simultaneously, a parallel process waits for the response from the top node
through the release port. After that response is received, the next node in
the stack is placed at the top of the stack; ﬁnally, the value that was on top
is retrieved from the stack ambient using the popres port.
5 We use a “ ” instead of a variable name to denote that the value received on this port is
a dummy value used only to establish the communication.
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4.2 Authentication Using Passwords
This example shows the implementation of a mechanism similar to the capa-
bilities in NBA [5] that use passwords as an access control to enter or exit into
other ambients. The example corresponds to the situation depicted in Figure
1(b).
An agent request access to a system sys by sending its credentials to
AUTH , the process in charge of the authentication procedure.
agent[ in{sys with passwd}.P ] | AUTH | sys[ ACCESS | SYS ]
AUTH is continuously listening for incoming requests. On each request,
it tests the given password, either granting the requested access or informing
that the access was denied.
AUTH = !(m,mpwd)
↓authreq .[mpwd = goodpwd]{GRANT}{DENY }
GRANT = 〈granted〉↓authres.〈m〉↓grant
DENY = 〈denied〉↓authres
The agent uses the macro in{n with passwd} to request access.
in {n with passwd}.P = REQUEST agent(sys, passwd) | ( )
go.in n.P )
The REQUEST process continuously tries to get access by sending its
credentials and waiting for a response each time. Therefore, the continuation
process P is blocked until the access is granted.
REQUESTm(n, pwd) = (νp do auth : amb)( 〈try〉
do auth |
!( )do auth.〈m, pwd〉↑authreq .(res)↑authres [res =
granted]{〈ok〉go}{〈retry〉do auth})
where m is the name of the ambient requesting permission to enter the ambient n.
Finally, after AUTH authorizes the access, it communicates with the sys-
tem to allow the access of the authenticated process via a port named grant.
ACCESS = !(a)↑grant.in{a}
5 Summary and Conclusions
Continuing our earlier work on BACI[1], the calculus presented here aims
to further decouple communication from mobility. This is achieved by the
introduction of multiple ports that are exclusively used for communication.
The addition of access control lists to co-capabilities enables better mobil-
ity control. These ﬁne-grained co-capabilities are useful in encoding speciﬁc
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mechanisms that can be used transparently, without any side-eﬀects on the
ambient mobility control. Multiple ports reduce the need for complex encod-
ings to implement several communication channels, rendering speciﬁcations
closer to the reality being modeled. An excessive use of ports could be re-
duced by extending the calculus with session types [9] for communication
ports. Moreover, a type system including session types would enforce stronger
type safety guarantees that the ones presented here.
Also, the introduction of co-capabilities that also bind the name of the
entering ambient, similar to NBA [5] co-capabilities, could give each ambient
additional control over its child ambients.
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